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IS THERE LIFE AFTER DEATH FOR SPORTS LEAGUE
IMMUNITY? AMERICAN NEEDLE AND BEYOND
MEIR FEDERI

I.

INTRODUCTION

For all of the occasional complexity of antitrust law, section 1
of the Sherman Antitrust Act is, in important ways, extraordinary in
its simplicity. Section 1 broadly applies to all concerted activity,
prohibiting all agreements-" [e]very contract, combination .

.

. or

conspiracy"I-that fail a single ultimate test: "whether the challenged agreement is one that promotes competition or one that
suppresses competition."2 While that question may sometimes be
answered quickly, such as through per se rules or quick look analysis,
it is an inquiry to which (but for a narrow set of statutory exceptions) all concerted conduct is subject-as the Supreme Court has
underscored by rejecting arguments that the special characteristics
of one industry or another exempt it from section 1 scrutiny.3
For decades prior to American Needle, Inc. v. National Football
League,4 various professional sports leagues and their members doggedly pursued a variation on this "special characteristics" argument
for antitrust immunity. These leagues argued that the inherent

t Partner, Jones Day. J.D., Harvard Law School, 1989. Meir Feder was one of
the attorneys who represented American Needle in the Supreme Court, and Jones
Day also represented one of the parties in Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, another case
discussed in this Essay. The views expressed in this Essay are solely his own. Thanks
to Jonathan D. Lamberti for his assistance in the drafting of this Essay, to Chris
Sagers and Abbe Gluck for their invaluable comments, and to the editors of the
Villanova Sports & Entertainment Law Journal for organizing the stimulating symposium at which the thoughts in the Essay were first presented.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890).
2. Nat'l Soc. of Prof'1 Engineers v. U.S., 435 U.S. 679, 691-92 (1978) ("Engineers") (holding that the Rule of Reason requires courts to determine whether the
challenged restraint promotes or suppresses competition "by analyzing the facts
peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint, and the reasons why it was
imposed," without regard to arguments that competition in a particular industry is
inimical to public interest).
3. See Engineers, 435 U.S. at 689-90 (rejecting exemption argument based on
public safety considerations); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 786-87
(1975) (holding that Congress did not intend to exclude learned professions from
Sherman Act regulation, finding exclusions based on "[t]he nature of an occupation" alone to be contrary to Congressional intent); but cf id. at 792 n.17 ("[t]he
fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished from a business"
may be relevant to how the Sherman Act is applied).
4. 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010).
(407)
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need for cooperation to produce league sports made league members (unlike the members of other, presumably less special, joint
ventures) effectively a "single entity"-and therefore not subject to
section 1, which addresses only agreements among multiple actors.
This argument persisted for decades despite a consistent lack of
success in the lower courts, 5 until, in American Needle, the Supreme
Court appeared to put it to rest. Unanimously rejecting any special
sports league exemption from antitrust scrutiny, the court held that
an agreement among separately owned and controlled sports
teams, like all other concerted conduct, must be judged by its competitive effects.6 In short, American Needle appeared to be the end of
the line for what one commentator aptly termed the "holy grail" of
professional sports leagues-the prospect of immunity from section
1 scrutiny.7
Or so, at least, one could be excused for thinking. The immunity argument had barely been interred by American Needle before it
was reincarnated in new and-I will argue-equally meritless
forms.8 Gregory Werden suggests in this volume both that American
Needle left room for a sports league to be treated as a single entity
for certain purposes, and that Texaco Inc. v. Daghe-an earlier case
that expressly declined to address arguments for section 1 immunity-carves out a new zone of "core functions" of sports leagues
and other joint ventures that are exempt from antitrust scrutiny.1 0
And James Keyte, an antitrust litigator who represents professional
5. See Gabriel Feldman, The Puzzling Persistence of the Single-Entity Argument for
Sports Leagues: American Needle and the Supreme Court's Opportunity to Reject a Flawed
Defense, 2009 Wis. L. REv. 835, 846-47 (2009) (citing L.A. Mem'1 Coliseum Comm'n
v. Nat'1 Football League, 726 F.2d. 1381 (9th Cir. 1984) (rejecting single entity
status); Sullivan v. Nat'l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091 (1st Cir. 1994)) (noting
lower court decisions that rejected single-entity argument).
6. See Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2212-14 (rejecting NFL's single entity arguments); see also id. at 2216-17 (holding Rule of Reason applicable to NFL and other
joint ventures whose products require some level of cooperation); id. at 2217 n.10
("The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed . . . merely regulates ...
competition or whether it . .. may suppress or even destroy competition.").
7. See Feldman, supra note 5, at 836, 851 (terming single-entity immunity the
"holy grail" for sports leagues because it would exempt them from most antitrust
regulation). Exemption from section 1 scrutiny would leave league members subject only to the considerably less demanding anti-monopolization provisions of section 2 of the Sherman Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 2.
8. Or perhaps, if I may push the "holy grail" concept beyond the breaking
point, these new arguments treat the seemingly mortal blow inflicted by American
Needle as in fact "just a flesh wound." MoNTY PYrHON AND THE HOLY GRAIL (Twickenham Film Studios 1975).
9. 547 U.S. 1 (2006).
10. See GregoryJ. Werden, American Needle and the Application of the Sherman Act
to Professional Sports Leagues, 18 Vi.L. SPORTs & ENT. L.J. 395, 404-06 (2011).
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sports leagues, has argued for a Dagher-based "core functions" immunity so broad as to occupy much of the space previously filled by
the now-discredited "single entity" argument."
This Essay argues that these new theories of sports league immunity-the "B Team" of immunity arguments, one might call
them-are no more persuasive than the "A Team" arguments unanimously routed in American Needle. Part I summarizes the American
Needle case. Part II explores what was at stake in the case and its
implications for future sports league immunity arguments. Part III
addresses, and takes issue with, Werden's and Keyte's arguments
that a zone of immunity for sports leagues survives American Needle.
II.

AMERICAN NEEDLE

Prior to 2000, the National Football League ("NFL") teams had
jointly licensed the individual teams' trademarks-primarily
through an entity they controlled known as National Football
League Properties, Inc. ("NFLP")-to multiple licensees. In 2000,
the teams voted to enter into an exclusive contract with Reebok to
make, among other things, trademarked headwear. When American Needle, which had been one of the nonexclusive licensees,
challenged this action as a violation of section 1, the NFL teams
argued that they were a "single entity" immune from section 1 scrutiny under Copperweld Corp. v. Independent Tube Corp.,12 which held
that a parent corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary are effectively a single enterprise whose components are incapable of an
"agreement" subject to section 1.13 American Needle responded
that Copperweld was an intentionally narrow decision premised on,
and limited to, the intrinsic unity of a parent and wholly-owned subsidiary: an "agreement" between such entities cannot meaningfully
limit competition, according to Copperweld, because " [w] ith or without a formal 'agreement,' the subsidiary acts for the benefit of the
parent, its sole shareholder."' 4 The District Court took the defendants' view and entered summary judgment in their favor.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Notwithstanding Copperweld's
reasoning emphasizing that "a parent and a wholly owned subsidiary always have a 'unity of purpose or a common design' "I 5-such
11. SeeJames A. Keyte, American Needle- A New Quick Look forJoint Ventures, 25
ANTrrRUST 48, 51-52 (2010).
12. 467 U.S. 752 (1984)

13. See id. (holding that parent and subsidiary corporation were single enterprise whose members cannot "agree" for purposes of section 1).
14. Id. at 771-72.
15. Id. at 772 (citation omitted).
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that an agreement between them could not eliminate any independence that would otherwise exist-the Seventh Circuit held that the
potentially divergent interests of the NFL teams did not prevent
them from being a single entity under Coppenveld.1 6 The key question, to the Seventh Circuit, was not whether the teams were capable of independence, but whether they were "one source of
economic power."' 7 The court did not define what constitutes a
single "source of economic power," but concluded that the need
for a degree of cooperation to produce football games meant that
"the NFL teams can function only as one source of economic power
when collectively producing NFL football." Positing that trademarks are used to promote football, the court further concluded
that "only one source of economic power controls the promotion of
NFL football."1 8
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the parties again joined issue
on the scope of the Copperweld doctrine. In addition, the Court was
presented by the Department ofJustice with a compromise position
of sorts, which the Government labeled an "effective merger" analysis. The Government proposed that joint ventures like sports
leagues could be treated as single entities when two conditions were
met:
First, the teams and the league must have effectively
merged the relevant aspect of their potential operations,
thereby eliminating actual or potential competition
among the teams and between the teams and the league
in that operational sphere. Second, the challenged restraint must not significantly affect actual or potential
competition among the teams or between the teams and
the league outside their merged operations.' 9
Where both prongs are satisfied, under this approach, the venture's actions would be treated as those of a single entity. However,
16. See Am. Needle Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 538 F.3d 736, 743 (7th Cir.
2008).
17. Id. at 743.
It thus follows that only one source of economic power controls the promotion of NFL football; it makes little sense to assert that each individual
team has the authority, if not the responsibility, to promote the jointly
produced NFL football . .. [t]he NFL teams share a vital economic interest in collectively promoting NFL football.
Id.
18. Id.
19. Brief of United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Am. Needle
v. Nat'l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010) (No. 08-661), available at http://
wwwjustice.gov/atr/cases/f250300/250316.htm [Hereinafter Brief of U.S.].

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol18/iss2/4

4

Feder: Is There Life after Death for Sports League Immunity - American N

20111

LiFE ArTER DEATH FOR SPORTS LEAGUE IMMUNITY?

411

the Government added-seemingly negating much of the practical
effect of this test-that even in such cases, the plaintiff would ordinarily be able to challenge the "effective merger" itself, i.e., the
original "eliminat[ion of] actual or potential competition" that created the effective merger in the first place. 20
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, in an opinion by
Justice Stevens that reiterated the applicability of section 1 to all
agreements between independently owned and controlled entities.2 ' The Court framed the key question as whether the alleged
agreement "joins together separate decisionmakers" capable of
making independent decisions-that is, whether the parties to the
agreement are "separate economic actors pursuing separate economic interests," such that the agreement "deprives the marketplace of independent centers of decisionmaking . . . and thus of

actual or potential competition."2 2 The Court-citing cases like
United States v. Sealy, Inc.,2 3 in which even a single corporation was
held subject to section 1 because the corporation was "controlled by
a group of competitors" 24-emphasized that this question turns on
substance (whether entities with distinct interests are involved)
rather than the form of the entity.2 5
Under this analysis, the Court held that the separate interests
of the NFL teams precluded their treatment as a single enterprise
immune from section 1: "NFL teams do not possess either the unitary decisionmaking quality or the single aggregation of economic
power," and each team has a "separate corporate consciousness." 26
The Court dismissed the relevance of the argument that cooperation is necessary to form a sports league, observing that "[tlhejustification for cooperation is not relevant to whether the cooperation
is concerted or independent action."2 7 So long as the NFL teams
were independent actors with independent interests, their agreement to license collectively "deprive[d] the marketplace of independent centers of decisionmaking" and fell within section 1.28
20. Id.
21. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2206-16
(2010).
22. Id. at 2207-08.
23. 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
24. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2209.
25. Id. at 2209-10.
26. Id. at 2212 (identifying NFL teams as "substantial, independently owned,
independently managed businesses").
27. Id. at 2214.
28. See id. (quoting Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769
(1984)).
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Nor, the Court held, did it matter that the teams had formed a
nominally unitary entity in NFLP, because "competitors 'cannot
simply get around' antitrust liability by acting 'through a third-party
intermediary or joint venture.' "29
The Court likewise gave short shrift to the "effective merger"
theory presented by the Solicitor General, observing in a footnote
that even under "the Government's own standard" the agreements
at issue "would constitute concerted action," and that in any event
the decisions of NFLP "are for all functional purposes choices made
by the 32 entities with potentially competing interests."so
Finally, the Court observed that the applicability of section 1
hardly portends disaster for sports leagues like the NFL, because
simply subjecting them to antitrust scrutiny does not mean their

agreements are necessarily unlawful: "Football teams that need to
cooperate are not trapped by antitrust law." 3 ' The Court noted that
special characteristics of a sports league may justify certain agree-

ments as procompetitive rather than anticompetitive under the
Rule of Reason. Further, borrowing language associated with its socalled "quick look" cases, the Court observed that the Rule of Reason analysis "'can sometimes be applied in the twinkling of an
eye' "3 2 - Signaling that in appropriate cases legality under the Rule
of Reason might be easily demonstrated. At the same time, the
Court cautioned, the "the conduct at issue . . . is still concerted

activity under the Sherman Act that is subject to §1 analysis."3 3
III.

UNDERSTANDING AMERICAN NEEDLE, AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
FOR ANTITRUST IMMUNITIES

American Needle was, at bottom, a battle between two views of
Copperweld. American Needle argued, in essence, that Copperweld

was a narrow case about entities that are incapable of meaningful
independent action. From an antitrust standpoint, no meaningful
"contract, combination . . . or conspiracy"3 4 between such entities is

possible, because with or without an agreement the entities are
owned and controlled by a single decisionmaker. In this view, Copperweld is limited to entities that, like a parent and wholly-owned
29. See id. at 2215-16 (quoting Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino,
Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 336 (2d Cir. 2008)) (Sotomayor,J., concurring) (addressing use
of third-party intermediaries or joint ventures).
30. Id. at 2216 n.9.
31. Id. at 2216.
32. Id. at 2217 (quoting NCAA, 468 U. S. at 109 n.39).
33. Id. at 2216.
34. Sherman Antitrust Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890).
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subsidiary, inherently have "a complete unity of interest."3 5 All
other entities are capable of independent action, and their agreements are therefore subject to section 1 scrutiny to determine
whether the agreements unreasonably eliminate that independent
action.
The Seventh Circuit, and the NFL, took a much broader view
of Copperweld, interpreting the decision as applying even to entities
that are capable of competing with each other. Copperweld, under
this approach, requires a somewhat metaphysical inquiry into
whether the multiple entities at issue can be understood as a "single
source of economic power." In this view, the need for cooperation
to play football games-the NFL argued that "the member clubs of
a professional sports league are inherently unable to compete at
all" without collaboration-was enough to make the NFL teams
"one source of economic power," and therefore exempt from section 1 under Copperweld even in areas (like trademark licensing)
where they were capable of competing.3 6
The Supreme Court definitively resolved this tug-of-war in
favor of the narrow interpretation of Copperweld, expressly disapproving any "metaphysical" inquiry into "whether the parties involved 'seem' like one firm or multiple firms."3 7 Rather, so long as
an "agreementjoins together 'independent centers of decisionmaking,' . . . the entities are capable of conspiring under

§ 1,

and the

court must decide whether the restraint of trade is an unreasonable
and therefore illegal one."3 8 In short, the Court held that the joint
conduct of "substantial, independently owned, and independently
managed business[es]" with distinct interests simply is not single
entity conduct under Copperweld.3 9
This holding is an important one, but there is nothing about
the decision that should be seen as surprising. Indeed, much as I
would like to portray Ameican Needle as a startling upset that resulted solely from my firm's brilliant lawyering, it would be more
accurate to say that the decision was (or at least should have been)
35. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771.
36. See Brief of Respondent, American Needle, Inc. v. National Football
League, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010) (No. 08-661), 2009 WL 3865438. See also Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 538 F.3d 736, 743 (7th Cir. 2008) ("Asserting
that a single football team could produce a football game is less of a legal argument than it is a Zen riddle: Who wins when a football team plays itself").
37. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2211-12.
38. Id. at 2211-12 (quoting Copperweld, 467 U.S. 752 (1984)).
39. See id. at 2212 (discussing decision-making of NFL teams).
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a predictable one. 4 0 Understanding what made it predictable,
moreover, goes a long way toward demonstrating the flaws of the
next generation of arguments for sports league immunity. It is for
this reason that it is worth exploring why the Court had to decide
the case as it did-not to relitigate it, but rather to lay a foundation
for spotting the ways in which the same issues recur in the newlycrafted immunity arguments.
First, one of the enduring puzzles of the NFL's (and the Seventh Circuit's) argument-that sports leagues are exempt from section 1 because such leagues inherently require some degree of
cooperation-is that it always seemed flatly inconsistent with National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents41 (NCAA) (a
case decided within days of Copperweld). In NCAA, the Court
squarely addressed the need for cooperation among members of a
sports league, and how that need affects antitrust analysis."2 The
consequence of that need, the Court explained, is that agreements
within such leagues are subject to Rule of Reason, rather than per se,
scrutiny."3 The Court did not say such leagues should be immune

under section 1; to the contrary, the Court emphasized that, notwithstanding any need for cooperation, 'joint ventures have no immunity from the antitrust laws.""4 It is hard to see how the Court

40. There was no shortage of predictions that the Supreme Court would affirm the Seventh Circuit. Sixty percent of the respondents at the FantasySCOTUS
website predicted an affirmance. SeeJosh Blackman, FantasySCOTUS: Predictionsfor
Bilski, American Needle, Stop the Beach, PCAOB, Black, and Graham, ABOVETHE
LAW.cOM (March 26, 2010, 4:05 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2010/03/fantasy
scotus-predictions-for-bilski-american-needle-stop-the-beach-pcaob-black-and-graham/#. See also Chrisopher Sagers, American Needle, Dagher, and the Evolving Antitrust Theory of the Firm: What Will Become of Section 1?, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Aug. 2009
(online publication of ABA Section of Antitrust Law), available at http://www.aba
net.org/antitrust/at-source/09/08/AugO9-Sagers8-12f.pdf. To be sure, this probably tells us more about the heuristics used in predicting the outcome of Supreme
Court cases-e.g., looking to the Court's recent trend of ruling for antitrust defendants, or characterizations of the Court as "pro-business"-than it does about
whether the decision was predictable as a matter of antitrust law.
To be clear, I am not suggesting that advocacy played no role in the case-to
the contrary, I am (unsurprisingly) quite proud of my firm's work in the case, and
I firmly believe that effective advocacy can be critical to making clear why a particular result is necessarily correct. But by the same token I think it is important to be
clear that the Court's decision was far more consistent with established antitrust
law, properly understood, than was the alternative.

41. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
42. See NCAA, 486 U.S. at 117.
43. See id. at 100-01.
44. Id. at 113.
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could have accepted the NFL's "need to cooperate" argument as a
basis for immunity without effectively overruling NCAA. 45
More generally, NCAA is but one example of the Court's consistent refusal to carve out specific industries or types of conduct as
antitrust-free zones. Even where the Court has recognized that potential procompetitive justifications make per se liability inappropriate, the Court has consistently refrained from taking the further
step of immunizing the conduct entirely. In addition to NCAA, examples include BroadcastMusic Inc. v. Columbia Broadcast System, Inc.
(Broadcast Music) ,46 Northwest Wholesale Stationers v. Pacific Stationery
6&PrintingCo. (Northwest Wholesale Stationers),47 and (at least if read
literally, as I believe it should be) Dagher. Simply put, the Court has
consistently refused to turn potential justifications for collaboration
among potential competitors into blanket immunities.4 8
Second, and not unrelated, whether leagues members need to
cooperate in some respects-or may in some metaphysical sense
constitute a "single source of power"-has strikingly little to do with
the lodestar of all antitrust doctrine: whether the conduct at issue
"promotes competition or . . . suppresses competition."4 9 The
NFL's argument, in other words, was not an argument that the conduct it sought to immunize would never be anticompetitive.
Rather, it was an argument that the conduct should be immune
from scrutiny even if the conduct is overtly anticompetitive, i.e.,
that Copperweld creates a zone of immunity broad enough to apply
even to agreements that overtly eliminate competition from the
marketplace. The Seventh Circuit, it is worth recalling, applied sin-

45. The NFL argued that NCAA could be distinguished as dealing with college
rather than professional leagues, but it is hard to see why this should make a difference. Moreover, NCAA itself made clear that it regarded the NCAA as indistinguishable from other sports leagues. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 100-01.
46. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
47. 472 U.S. 284 (1985).
48. Copperweld, as will be seen, is fully consistent with this assertion. As American Needle argued, and as I briefly address in further detail, the key to Copperweld
is that a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary have no potential for meaningful
independence or competition. The case did not immunize any conduct restraining competition that (but for the restraint) would otherwise exist.
49. Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'1 Eng'rs. v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978)
[Engineers]. The "need to cooperate" argument also, as Justice Stevens observed,
does not speak to the distinction between unilateral and concerted action: "[t]he
justification for cooperation is not relevant to whether that cooperation is concerted or independent action." Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 130 S.
Ct. 2201, 2214 (2010).
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gle-entity immunity despite recognizing that trademark licensing
50
was an area in which the teams were capable of competing.

It should have been clear (as it was to most courts that addressed sports league single-entity arguments prior to American Needle) that this was an untenable reading of Coppeweld, both in view of
the Coppenveld opinion itself and even more importantly-particu-

larly for the next generation of arguments for sports league immunity-because the notion of an immunity without regard to
competitive effects is so foreign to the entire sweep of antitrust law.
Absent a constitutional imperative51 or specific congressional intent, the Supreme Court has consistently insisted that antitrust
questions be analyzed-and antitrust doctrines justified-solely by
reference to competitive effects. The Court has repeatedly rejected
arguments that other considerations should override this focus on
competitive effects, to the point that even public safety considerations cannot justify an exemption from this "basic policy of the
Sherman Act." 52
Copperweld, even though not articulated as a doctrine of competitive effects, nicely illustrates the primacy of such effects even in
drawing the boundary between concerted and unilateral conduct.
It is here that I part company with Professor Sagers, who apparently
sees Coppenveld as (at least at some level) indifferent to competitive
effects, indeed as "pretty plainly" inviting the lower courts to push
50. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 538 F.3d 736, 737-38 (7th
Cir. 2008) (explaining court's analysis). To be sure, the NFL and the Seventh
Circuit both suggested that the NFL's licensing restraints could be procompetitive,
arguing primarily that they made the NFL a more effective competitor against
other forms of entertainment. See id. at 742-43 (stating court's reasoning). But
neither seriously argued that these effects were so plainly procompetitive as to satisfy the usual standards for determining the competitive effects of a particular type
of agreement on a per se basis. And in the absence of such a showing, NFL team
agreements could not properly be declared automatically lawful on the basis of
their procompetitive effects.

51. For example, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which immunizes actions
seeking to influence the passage or enforcement of laws, is based on First Amendment considerations, including the right to petition the government for the redress of grievances. See City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365,
380 (1991) (quoting E..LR. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S.
127, 141 (1961)).
52. Engineers, 435 U.S. at 695. Likewise, even when procompetitive benefits
are held to justify a degree of cooperation among competitors, such exceptions to
the "otherwise inflexible prohibition of agreements eliminating rivalry" are "confin [ed] ... to the ... reason for [their] existence." ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRusT PARADOx 267 (1978). As judge Posner has written, "[i]t does not follow that

because two firms sometimes have a cooperative relationship there are no competitive gains from forbidding them to cooperate in ways that yield no economies but
simply limit competition." Gen. Leaseways, Inc. v. Nat'l Truck Leasing Ass'n, 744
F.2d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 1984).
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the single entity concept beyond the parent-subsidiary context by
"develop [ing] some theory of the firm" that may or may not have a
clear relationship to competitive effects. 53 While there is much
common ground between us-as a normative matter, I fully agree
with him that a single-entity immunity extending to anticompetitive
agreements cannot be justified-I do not think Coppenreld could
fairly be read, even before American Needle, as creating or inviting
any such competition-indifferent immunity.
The core of Coppenveld is its (intrinsically narrow) reasoning
that an "agreement" between a parent and wholly owned subsidiary-just like coordination between a company and its unincorporated division-cannot possibly eliminate independent action from
the marketplace. 5 4 In each case, regardless of whether there is any

formal agreement, there is inherently a "complete unity of interest"
that precludes meaningful independence.5 5 The "agreement," as
the Court carefully emphasized, therefore eliminates no competition or independent conduct that might otherwise exist:
For similar reasons [to those applicable to an unincorporated division], the coordinated activity of a parent and its
wholly owned subsidiary must be viewed as that of a single
enterprise for purposes of § 1 of the Sherman Act. A parent and its wholly owned subsidiary have a complete unity
of interest. Their objectives are common, not disparate;
their general corporate actions are guided or determined
not by two separate corporate consciousnesses, but one.

They are not unlike a multiple team of horses drawing a
vehicle under the control of a single driver. With or without a formal "agreement," the subsidiary acts for the benefit of the parent, its sole shareholder. If a parent and a
wholly owned subsidiary do "agree" to a course of action,
53. Prof. Sagers was a panelist at the same symposium that resulted in this
article and also wrote an article published in Volume 18, Issue 2 of this lawjournal.
See Chris Sagers, Why Copperweld Was Actually Kind of Dumb: Sound, Fury, and the
Once and Still Missing Antitrust Theory of the Firm, 18 ViLL. SPORTs & ENT. L.J. 377
(2011).
54. The Copperweld Court explained at length that a wholly-owned subsidiary
was not meaningfully different from an unincorporated division. See Capperweld,
467 U.S. at 770-71 (noting "general agreement that § 1 is not violated by the internally coordinated conduct of a corporation and one of its unincorporated divisions"). Notably, the entire argument of the petitioner in Copperweldwas that there
was no basis in antitrust policy for treating a wholly-owned subsidiary differently
from an unincorporated division. See Brief of Petitioner, Copperweld v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984) No. 82-1260.
55. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771
(1984).
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there is no sudden joining of economic resources that had
previously served different interests, and there is no justification for § 1 scrutiny.
Indeed, the very notion of an "agreement" in Sherman Act
terms between a parent and a wholly owned subsidiary lacks meaning .... [I]n reality a parent and a wholly owned subsidiary always
have a "unity of purpose or a common design." They share a common purpose whether or not the parent keeps a tight rein over the
subsidiary; the parent may assert full control at any moment if the
subsidiary fails to act in the parent's best interests.5 6
I do not think this reasoning can fairly be read as permitting
an open-ended quest for a "theory of the firm"-or, indeed, as supporting single-entity immunity for any agreement between entities
that are capable of competing with each other (or otherwise acting
independently). That is, the Copperweld Court was quite clear that
the absence of any potential for competition was essential to its
holding that "there is no justification for § 1 scrutiny."5 7
In seeing Coppeneld-notwithstanding this reasoning-as inviting a broad and open-ended "theory of the firm," Professor Sagers
may be taking his cue from a few broad lower court interpretations
of Coppeweld rather than from Coppenveld itself.58 Even in the lower
courts, moreover, I am far from convinced that there has been a
systematic problem with courts seeing Copperweld as malleable
enough tojustify immunity for agreements between entities that are
capable of competing with each other. To the contrary, I think
Judge Kozinski was correct in observing that most courts presented
with single-entity arguments "have required ... that the constituent
entities be neither actual nor potential competitors."5 9 That is not
56. Id. at 771-72 (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 772.
58. My disagreement with Professor Sagers, to be clear, is limited to our respective views of Coppenreld. I think we are largely in agreement on what I see as
the more important issue: that a broad immunity defined without regard to competitive effects is inconsistent with the goals of antitrust law.
59. Freeman v. San Diego Ass'n of Realtors, 322 F.3d 1133, 1149 (9th Cir.
2003). Judge Boudin, in his thoughtful opinion in Fraser,made the related observation that there is "not a lot" of circuit court case law expanding Copperweld beyond its factual setting. See Fraser v. Major League Soccer, LLC, 284 F.3d 47, 58
n.6 (1st Cir. 2002). His opinion also suggested that any attempt to do so would be
fraught with difficulty and inferior to straightforward analysis under the Rule of
Reason. See id. at 59. Once one goes beyond the classic single enterprise, including Copperweld situations, it is difficult to find an easy stopping point or even decide
on the proper functional criteria for hybrid cases. To the extent the criteria reflect
judgments that a particular practice in context is defensible, assessment under section 1 is more straightforward and draws on developed law. Id.
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to deny that there are marginal cases in which the result required
by Copperweld is less than completely clear. 60 But to say that such
close-to-the-line cases exist is a far cry from saying that the lower
courts have seen Copperweld as inviting an open-ended "theory of
the firm" inquiry so broad as to authorize immunity even for agreements to restrict competition.
More importantly, even if certain lower courts may have perceived such an invitation in Copperweld, that hardly establishes that
these courts were reading Copperweld correctly. Indeed, the prime
example of such a broad reading of Copperweld-Judge Easterbrook's opinion in Chicago Professional Sports, LP v. NBA61 (Bulls
17)-fairly obviously makes little effort to parse the opinion in Copperweld.6 2 This is unsurprising in light of how carefully Copperweld
itself emphasized that its parent-subsidiary immunity resulted from
the conclusion that truly independent action by a wholly-owned
subsidiary was inherently impossible .63
60. Copperweld's implications for majority-but-less-than-100%-owned subsidiaries, for example, have not been free from doubt.
61. 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996).
62. See id. at 598. Judge Easterbrook declined to accept that Copperweld required a "complete unity of interest," based not on any analysis of Copperweld, but
on the ground that he deemed such a criterion "silly," since "even a single firm
contains many competing interests." Id. This refusal to accept Coppenveld's stated
reasoning is far from persuasive evidence of what Copperweld actually said.
It is also worth noting one obvious response to Judge Easterbrook's observation:
the entire point of Copperweld is that potentially competing interests at lower levels
of a firm are irrelevant when there is unitary control of the firm's actions in the
marketplace. See Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 769-72 (discussing irrelevance of competing interest at lower levels of firm); see also, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, ExclusiveJoint
Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 1 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 1, 54 (1995) ("[N]eoclassical
price theory regards the firm as a profit-maximizing entity and does not give any
special consideration to the conflicting preferences of its managers or other employees."). That individual employees within a firm may have competing interests
hardly makes it "silly" to draw a distinction (as Copperweld plainly does), between
entities that have a complete unity of interest-because they are unitarily owned
and controlled-and those that do not. As Copperweldemphasizes, only the former
are incapable of meaningful independent action, and therefore only as to the former is there "no justification for § 1 scrutiny." Coppenreld, 467 U.S. at 772.
63. None of this is to suggest that Copperweld was a flawlessly-written opinion.
In particular, the opinion courts confusion by framing its analysis as one that favored "substance" or "reality" over "form." Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 772. This framing was unfortunate, because substance-over-form, at least in the abstract, can be
read to suggest an open-ended, standard-based rather than rule-based, inquiry. (It
is doubly unfortunate that American Needle perpetuated this substance versus form
framing. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2211
(2010).) But this would be a misunderstanding, because in the Copperweld taxonomy a parent's one-hundred percent ownership of a subsidiary is a matter of "substance," not one of "form." What the Court meant by "reality" and "substance" was
the reality that a wholly-owned subsidiary is not meaningfully distinct from its parent, as contrasted with the "form" of treating the subsidiary as separate merely
because of the formality of separate incorporation. See, e.g. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at
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From this perspective, it was always hard to imagine the Supreme Court adopting an understanding of Copperweld that would
create a section I exemption for agreements among potential competitors-whether based on a "theory of the firm" or on some metaphysical notion of a single "source of economic power"-and it can
hardly be surprising that the Court decisively rejected that option.
American Needle reminds us that there is little room in antitrust law
for arguments that diverge from a focus on whether competition is
being unreasonably restrained. That inquiry, as the Court emphasized, need not be a painful one for antitrust defendants: "the Rule
of Reason may not require a detailed analysis; it 'can sometimes be
applied in the twinkling of an eye' [-and, indeed, restraints that]
'are essential if the product is to be available at all,"' like sports
league agreements on the rules of play, are "likely to survive the
Rule of Reason."64 But the Court's willingness to entertain such
arguments remains confined to applications of competitive effects
analysis, not arguments for avoiding it.
IV.

LiFE AFTER DEATH?

On its face, American Needle broadly ruled out "single entity"
status for sports leagues and other joint ventures of "substantial, independently owned, and independently managed business [es] ."65
Where a venture is controlled by independent entities with potentially distinct interests, any agreement among them represents the
joining together of potentially independent economic forces and,
therefore, constitutes concerted action subject to section 1. The
Court's opinion therefore appears to leave little room for ongoing
efforts to apply single-entity immunity to such joint ventures of entities lacking what Copperweld described as a "complete unity of
interest." 66
771-73 (illustrating this distinction). As the Government's amicus brief in American
Needle noted, in the relevant sense separate ownership "is notjust a matter of form,
but creates 'functional differences' that are 'significant for antitrust policy."' Brief
of U.S., supra note 19, at 23.
64. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2217 (quoting NCAA, 468 U. S. at 109 n. 39).
65. Id. at 2212.
66. The one area in which a modest expansion of Coppenueld appears possible
is one consistent with this "complete unity of interest" criterion, exemplified by the
question the Court declined to reach in Dagher. Dagherinvolved a fully integrated
joint venture in which the participants-while independent entities in other markets-completely eliminated any distinct interests in the conduct of the joint venture, such that the venture was arguably a fully independent entity to which the
participants related solely "as investors, not competitors." Texaco Inc. v. Dagher,
547 U.S. 1, 6 (2006). The Dagher Court declined to address this fact-specific single
entity argument, see id. at 7 n.2, and the argument has little relevance to more
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Not everyone, however, has accepted that American Needle forecloses arguments for sports league immunity. Gregory Werden and
James Keyte, in particular, have articulated theories under which
significant areas of immunity for sports leagues remain viable even
after American Needle. This Section identifies and addresses those
theories, which I believe to be fundamentally flawed.
A.

The Case-By-Case "Effective Merger" Theory

Gregory Werden reads American Needle's rejection of single entity immunity for sports leagues like the NFL as only partial. In
particular, he sees the case as suggesting approval of single-entity
treatment forjoint ventures, including sports leagues, in a variety of
circumstances, such as "when [the venture's] participants have no
material interests outside the venture" and "when its participants
can be expected to maximize the venture's profits rather than act
on interests they do have outside the venture."6 7 In this view, American Needle invites a case-by-case inquiry into whether the venture
participants have interests that are identical or divergent with respect to the restraint at issue, and the same joint venture can be a
collective (and therefore subject to section 1) in one case and a
single entity (and therefore exempt) in another.6 8 Mr. Werden,
who is Senior Economic Counsel for the Antitrust Division of the
Department ofJustice, goes on to suggest that this case-by-case analysis be performed by applying the "effective merger" test proposed
by the Solicitor General in American Needle. 6 9 That test would ask:
typical joint ventures (including sports leagues) in which the participants retain
distinct interests that go beyond those of mere investors.
67. Werden, supra note 10. Mr. Werden cites the example of a professional
services partnership, believing that "American Needle suggests that the partners do
not engage in concerted action when they set a schedule of fees for the firm." Id.
It is worth noting that the assumption that law firm partnerships (for example) do
not engage in concerted conduct is not universally shared. See, e.g., Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 224 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(dicta) (treating law firms as subject to section 1 scrutiny); BoRK, supra note 52, at
265-67 (same). Moreover, some firms have compensation structures under which
individual partners' interests may be served by a course of conduct that does not
maximize the firm's overall profits. See Hovenkamp, supra note 62, at 64 ("[T]he
individual members ofjoint ventures often have incentives that diverge from those
of the venture as a whole."). The question is, in any event, of little practical significance: for a variety of reasons-including but not limited to lack of market
power-the decisions of a single law firm will rarely be subject to any plausible
antitrust challenge.
68. See Werden, supra note 10 (discussing American Needle opinion).
69. See id. at 402-03. (advocating application of "effective merger" test in such
cases).
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[W]hether the joint venture's participants had "effectively
merged the relevant aspect of their operations, thereby
eliminating actual and potential competition" in the relevant market. If so, the court could ask whether the particular actions at issue nevertheless "significantly affect actual
or potential competition among" the participants in some
related market.7 0
This suggestion is problematic in a number of ways. As an initial matter, the notion that a joint venture should be treated as a
single entity whenever its members "can be expected to maximize
the venture's profits rather than act on interests they do have
outside the venture,"71 is troubling, and seemingly inconsistent with
American Needle itself. As the Court observed, a shared interest in
maximizing profitability is as typical of cartels as of legitimate joint
ventures: "If the fact that potential competitors shared in profits or
losses from a venture meant that the venture was immune from § 1,
then any cartel could evade the antitrust law simply by creating a
'joint venture' to serve as the exclusive seller of their competing
products."7 2
Second, the "effective merger" notion turns what is more properly treated as essentially a status determination-whether the entities at issue are distinct actors or (as in Copperweld) inherently
unitary-into a case-by-case examination of the effects of particular
agreements. To be sure, Copperweld considered competitive effects
in drawing the boundary between unilateral and concerted conduct, but that did not change the fact that the Court was defining a
status-whether a parent and its wholly-owned subsidiary are one
entity or two for purposes of the threshold plurality-of-actors requirement of section 1-and doing so on the ground that the subsidiary is always incapable of independent action.7 3 Appreciating
the rationale for turning this status question into an inquiry for
which the answer will vary from case to case for a single joint venture is difficult. Equally difficult is understanding why-in cases in
which it can be determined at the threshold that no actual or potential competition is at issue-the case could not readily be dis-

70. Id. at 403.
71. Id. at 401.
72. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2215 (2010)
(citation omitted).
73. See supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text.
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missed under traditional antitrust principles rather than requiring
the crafting of an entirely new "effective merger" defense.7 4
Third, as the Court apparently recognized when it dismissed
the Solicitor General's proposal in a footnote,'7 5 it is not evident
what the proposed effective merger test-with all of the complication inherent in litigating this additional issue-would accomplish.
As the Solicitor General conceded, even if the defendants can show
that they had "effectively merged" by eliminating competition
among themselves, a plaintiff would generally be permitted to challenge
that earlierelimination of competition under the Rule ofReason.76 Indeed,
in such a case, it is precisely that prior elimination of competition
that normally will be the focus of the antitrust case. In American
Needle, for example, the putative "effective merger" was the NFL
teams' original agreement to cease competing in trademark licensing and license only through NFLP-but that very agreement not
to compete was at the core of the antitrust challenge to the teams'
conduct.
B.

The Dagher"Core Activity" Argument

Mr. Werden also addresses another potential argument for partial sports league immunity, suggesting that a statement in Texaco,
Inc. v. Dagher-the Court's observation that antitrust's ancillary restraints doctrine "has no application" when "the business practice
being challenged involves the core activity of the joint venture itself"-can be read to immunize the "core activity" of ajoint venture
like a sports league.77 Putting aside for the moment the merit of
this suggestion-and I believe it to be a misreading of Dagher-Mr.
Werden at least takes a modest view of what might be such a "core
activity," using the example of a hypothetical Major League Baseball decision to move from a 162-game to a 154-game schedule.7 8
Here, too, it is difficult to see any need for the creation of such an
immunity-if there has been a plague of antitrust litigation over
league scheduling decisions, I am unaware of it-but at least the
74. This is particularly true in the aftermath of Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, which sanctioned the dismissal of implausible claims. See Bell Atlantic v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (requiring "enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.").
75. See Am. Needle, 130 S.Ct. at 2216 n.9.
76. See Brief for U.S., supra note 19, at 16, 28, 32 (conceding potential for
Rule of Reason challenge).
77. See Werden, supra note 10, at 404-05 (discussing Dagher 547 U.S. at 7).
78. See id.
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harm from such a narrow immunity, however unsound, would likely
be inconsequential.
The problem, however, is the ancient one of the camel's nose
in the tent, particularly in light of the inherent vagueness of the
phrase "core activity." Indeed, the camel may already be in the
tent: James Keyte (an antitrust litigator who represents professional
sports leagues) has argued that, combining American Needle's "quick
look" language with Dagher's discussion of "core" activities, even
such far-reaching restraints as broadcast restrictions and salary caps
are essentially immune from antitrust scrutiny.79 Mr. Keyte's argument runs as follows: (1) American Needle, in noting that the Rule of
Reason "'can sometimes be applied in the twinkling of an eye,'
approved the application of a "quick look" determination in favor
of antitrust defendants in appropriate cases; (2) "American Needle
arguably indicates" that the "'core' venture activities" of which
Dagherspoke "could be approved on a 'quick look;"' and (3) a host
of sports league restraints-indeed, a veritable owners' wish listcan be termed "core," and as such approved without detailed antitrust analysis.8 0
Before addressing in detail why neither Dagher nor American
Needle can be read to support this ambitious argument, it is worth
pausing to observe that-notwithstanding the superficial differences between this argument and the one rejected in American Needle-the argument's essence is yet another attempt to exempt
sports leagues from the single, universally-applicable question that
must be asked under section 1: "whether the challenged agreement
is one that promotes competition or one that suppresses competition."8 1 Unlike traditional "quick look" scrutiny-which is merely a
means of applying the Rule of Reason quickly when the result of
such scrutiny is obviouS8 2-the question of whether something may
be deemed a "core activity" of a sports league (or other joint venture) simply does not speak to whether it is procompetitive or anticompetitive; it is yet another attempt to substitute a quasimetaphysical concept-with "core activity" replacing "one source of
economic power" as the metaphysical concept of choice-for the

79. See Keyte, supra note 11, at 51-52 (arguing that "core" activities of professional sports leagues do not fall within purview of antitrust scrutiny).
80. Id. at 51-52.
81. Engineers, 435 U.S. at 691.
82. See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. F.T.C, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999) (holding that
more thorough analysis not required when anticompetitive effects are obvious).
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competitive effects analysis required by section 1.8 As described
earlier, such efforts to define a zone of antitrust immunity without
regard to competitive effects have, with good reason, been rejected
by the Supreme Court.
In any event, the "core activity" argument misreads Dagherand
American Needle as thoroughly as the single entity argument misread
Coppeneld. As an initial matter, the notion that Daghersupports any
sort of immunity for joint ventures is refuted by Dagheritself. Dagher
unanimously reversed a Ninth Circuit decision holding that a joint
venture's setting of a price for its product was a per se price-fixing
violation.8 4 The plaintiffs in Dagher waived any Rule of Reason

claim; as a result, the only issue before the Court concerned the
applicability of per se liability.8 5 Not only did the Court have no
occasion to address the application of the Rule of Reason-or of
any immunity from Rule of Reason scrutiny-but the Court expressly declined to address an argument for single-entity immunity,
and expressly indicated that the antitrust plaintiffs there could have
"challenged [the price-setting policy] pursuant to the rule of reason."8 6 The single sentence in Dagher referring to "core activity" of
the joint venture said only that such activities were not within the
scope of the ancillary restraints doctrine, not that they were exempt
from Rule of Reason scrutiny.87

83. Mr. Keyte's example of agreement on a player salary cap, for instance,
hardly qualifies as obviously satisfying the Rule of Reason. Indeed, player restraints
have previously been held to violate the Rule of Reason. See e.g., McNeil v. Nat'l
Football League, 790 F. Supp. 871 (D. Minn 1992).
84. 547 U.S. at 8 (holding that no per se violation existed when integrated
joint venture set the price of the venture's product).
85. See id. at 4 (discussing procedural posture of case).
86. Id. at 3. Some litigants have pointed to language in Dagherthat draws an
analogy to price-setting by a single firm; however the language at issue related to
why a per se rule was inapplicable, not to the creation of any immunity. See, e.g., id.
at 5 ("Price fixing agreements between two or more competitors ... are per se
unlawful. These cases do not present such an agreement . . . ."). The Court

merely equated the price-setting in Dagher with the price-setting in BroadcastMusic,
see id. at 5-8-and the Court in Broadcast Music made clear that that price-setting
"plainly involve[d] concerted action" subject to section 1 scrutiny. Broad. Music,
Inc. v. Columbia Broad. System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 10 (1979) (discussing alleged
price-setting by seller of aggregated music rights).
87. See Dagher,547 U.S. at 7-8 (clarifying ancillary restraints doctrine in relation to a venture's setting of price for its product). The Court described the ancillary restraints doctrine as addressing the validity of ajoint venture's restrictions on
the activities of individual members of the venture, indicating that the "courts
must determine whether the nonventure restriction is a naked restraint on trade,
and thus invalid, or one that is ancillary to the legitimate and competitive purposes
of the business association, and thus valid." Id. at 7.
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In addition, the notion that restraints like salary caps and
broadcasting restrictions can be deemed "core activities" demonstrably misconstrues what Dagher meant by that phrase. When
Dagher referred to "the core activity of the joint venture itself" the
Court was distinguishing between the activities of the collective venture entity and the individual activities (or restraints on the activities) of the separate members of that entity-with only the activities
of the former even potentially being "core."8 8 Specifically, the
Court contrasted "restrictions . . . on nonventure activities" with

challenges to the "core activity of the joint venture itself," and it
used examples that made clear that "nonventure activities" meant
any activities of the individual members, no matter how closely related to the venture.8 9 In particular, the Court cited NCAA as an
example of "restrictions . . . on nonventure activities," and the re-

strictions at issue in NCAA were restrictions on NCAA members'
broadcasting of their NCAA college football games.90 In short,
Dagher's notion of "core activity" by definition excludes all restraints
on the individual conduct of joint venture members. 9 '
Finally, the suggestion that "American Needle indicates that any
such core restrictions could be approved on a 'quick look,'" 9 2 cannot withstand scrutiny. American Needle's approval of "quick look"
scrutiny is limited to the traditional circumstances in which such
scrutiny is applicable: those in which the Rule of Reason can "'be
applied in the twinkling of an eye.'" 9 3 Nothing in American Needle
suggests that "quick look" might be extended to other circumstances, in which-rather than being a shortcut used where the
proper result under the Rule of Reason is obvious without need for
extended analysis-"quick look" is cited as a means to avoid applying the Rule of Reason at all.
88. See id. at 7 (emphasis added) (distinguishing core activity of collective venture entity from separate members of such entity).
89. See id. at 7-8 (2005) (discussing nonventure activities).
90. Id. at 7. Notably, this categorization of the broadcast restrictions in NCAA
as "restrictions ... on nonventure activities" rather than "core activity of the joint
venture itself" is inconsistent with Mr. Keyte's suggestion that "broadcast restrictions" can be deemed immune "core functions" under Dagher. Id.
91. Even were Dagher not so clear on this point, it is hard to conceive of a
justification for a broad definition of "core activity" that would make a large category of joint venture restraints-independent of any apparent economic justification-per se lawful under the antitrust laws. Dagher itself certainly does not
articulate any theory under which anything that might be labeled as "core" should
automatically be deemed permissible.
92. See Keyte, supra note 11, at 51-52.
93. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2217 (2010)
(quoting NCAA, 468 U.S. at 109 n.39).
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Indeed, the notion that there is something particularly noteworthy in American Needle's suggestion that defendants can win a
"quick look" victory-or that this language heralds any departure
from established, competition-centric doctrine-is puzzling. Defendants have always been able to obtain the equivalent of a "quick
look" victory when a plaintiff raises no plausible claim of an antitrust violation; indeed, many cases in which motions to dismiss antitrust complaints are granted can fairly be described as ones in
which the Rule of Reason was applied "'in the twinkling of an eye."'
And American Needle's related observation that restraints that "'are
essential if the product is to be available at all"' are "likely to survive
the Rule of Reason"94 says nothing new. As long ago as Broadcast
Music and NCAA, the Court clearly stated that restraints of this sort,
such as sports league "rules defining the conditions of the contest,"
were presumptively "procompetitive." 9 5
In short, American Needle's discussion of why "[f]ootball teams
that need to cooperate are not trapped by antitrust law"9 6 merely
demonstrates-using well-settled principles-that the applicability
of the Rule of Reason does not portend a dystopia in which the
Monday Night Football schedule and the standard of review for instant-replay challenges are governed by antitrust consent decrees.
Absent an argument that all "core activities" ofjoint ventures are so
inherently procompetitive as to pass Rule of Reason muster "in the
twinkling of an eye"-an argument I have yet to see attempted,
probably for good reason 9 7-there is simply no support in American
Needle for Mr. Keyte's notion that "core activities" of joint ventures
are automatically valid.
C.

The Argument For Immunizing Restraints On Competition
With The Venture

I should also briefly address yet another subversive idea offered
by Mr. Keyte: the suggestion that Dagherhas created another immunity, making it per se legal for a joint venture to adopt restraints
"preclud[ing] a venture member from competing against the venture." 98 While Dagher does contain language suggesting that ancil94. Id. at 2216 (quoting NCAA, 468 U.S. at 101).
95. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 117. See Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 23 ("Joint ventures
and other cooperative arrangements are also not usually unlawful ... where the
agreement .

.

. is necessary to market the product at all.").

96. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2216.
97. A persuasive version of such an argument is hard to imagine, particularly
if "core" is defined so elastically as to include such matters as player salary caps.
98. Keyte, supra note 11, at 53.
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lary restraints are automatically legal, the case does not say that a
restraint against competing with the venture is necessarily an ancillary restraint. 99 In fact, the law is authoritatively to the contrary:
absent convincing justification, venture members must be left free
to compete with the venture.100 As the Court stated in NCAA,
"[e]nsuring that individual members of a joint venture are free to
increase output has been viewed as central in evaluating the competitive character of joint ventures."1 0 1 To be sure, there are undoubtedly situations in which preventing venture members from
competing with the venture can be justified as procompetitive, but
this-as always-is a matter for proof, not for an a priori immunity
exempting such restraints without regard to their competitive
effects.
V.

CONCLUSION

American Needle should put an end to the argument that a
sports league is a single entity immune from antitrust scrutiny.
More generally, American Needle reinforces the need to view skeptically any argument purporting to define a zone of conduct as automatically lawful without regard to its competitive effects.
99. The correctness of the proposition that ancillary restraints are automatically lawful is dubious, but the Court's statement to that effect is, at worst, dicta.
100. See, e.g. United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 242 (2d Cir.
2003) ("Far from being 'presumptively legal,' such arrangements [not to compete
with the venture] are exemplars of the type of anticompetitive behavior prohibited
by the Sherman Act.").
101. NCAA, 468 U.S. 85, 115 (1984). In Broadcast Music "each individual remained free to sell his own music without restraint." Id. at 114.
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